Threat of Islamic Terrorism in the Netherlands

Autor: Martin van Buuren » Kategorie: 02/2005, Archiv » 01. 11. 2005

The objective of this paper is to examine the seriousness of the present threat of Islamic terrorism to Dutch national security. In the first section, the past experiences of Dutch society with terrorism will be dealt with. In the second section, briefly, the ongoing process of radicalisation of (especially young) Muslims, and terrorist recruitment activities are discussed. Then, the third section deals with the measures taken by the Dutch government to prevent acts of terrorism in the Netherlands. The fourth part is the conclusion, in which the present threat of Islamic terrorism in the Netherlands is assessed.

INTRODUCTION

The terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001; in Madrid on March 11, 2004; and in London in June and July this year, made clear in a highly unpleasant way that terrorism forms a threat to the national security of many countries. Especially in countries such as the Netherlands with a large immigrant population, a large part of which consists of Muslims, exist fears that their country is at serious risk of future radical Islamic terrorist attacks. The large number of Muslims present in the country enhance this fear, since after September 11, terrorism and the militant Islam often became to be perceived as identical concepts,[1] despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of Muslim immigrants are not involved in any way in the preparation and/or execution of terrorism attacks.

The perceived terrorism-threat is reflected in the policies of the Dutch government, which has, since 9/11 taken many measures to reduce the probability of terrorism attacks in the Netherlands.[2] So, the battle with terrorism holds a prominent place on the Dutch political agenda, since terrorism is perceived as an evident threat to national security.

However the terrorist threat in the Netherlands to date is for an important part still deduced from the international threat,[3] a number concrete events[4] in the Netherlands in recent years made visible a process of Islamic radicalisation in its society[5] and also the acute danger of future terrorist attacks also in this country. Information very recently released by the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), confirms that the present danger of terrorist attacks is “substantial”[6]. The AIVD in this released information points out that the present terrorist danger is deriving less from international terrorist networks and, instead, increasingly from local Dutch radical-Islamic networks, that are prepared to execute an attack on Dutch soil.[7] This “substantial” danger was indeed confirmed by the arrest, at the time of writing (October 2005), of 7 Islamic suspects in the immigrant neighbourhood of the city of The Hague, who were ostensibly making preparations for future terrorist activities.

As the working definition of Islamic terrorist movements in this paper I have used: movements that are aiming at „by (threatening with) politically motivated violence [eventually] realising a society, which is in line with a Islamic-fundamentalist constitution of the state, which is resulting from an extremist interpretation of the sources of Islam.”[8] In all sections, except for the following section (where it is also used to refer to the phenomenon of politically motivated terrorism in general), the concept of “terrorism” is used as identical to the concept of “Islamic terrorism”.

As definition of national security I have chosen that as recommended by Miroslav Mareš: „national security is a situation, in which [the state] is not seriously threatened [in relation to] its sovereignty, territorial integrity, the fundaments of its political organisation, domestic order and security, lives and health of its citizens, material values and environment.” [9] As far as the sources used are concerned, the paper mainly draws on several reports from the Dutch Ministry of Interior and the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD). In addition to this, two recently published books, a number of studies, and number of popular-media sources have been used.

I:DUTCH PAST EXPERIENCES WITH, AND ITS STATE OF PREPAREDNESS AGAINST TERRORISM BEFORE 9/11

The murder of Theo van Gogh in November 2004 was not the first time that the Dutch society saw itself confronted by an act of politically motivated terrorism. Although it was the first terrorist attack on Dutch soil motivated by radical-Islamic religious convictions, it was not the first politically motivated terrorist attack in Dutch history. The first terrorist actions/attacks in the Netherlands date back already to the 1970s and were mainly connected to problems that originated in the Dutch colonial past In addition to this, in the 1980s and 1990s also a number of terrorist acts took place in the Netherlands, mostly executed by the former left-wing orientated terrorist group named RaRa.[10]

According to Eric Vrijsen, the Netherlands had been for a long time very careful with using the term terrorism, when referring to events like those in the 70s, 80s and 90s, until film-maker Theo van Gogh was murdered in November 2004 by a radicalised Islamist, which served according to Vrijsen as ‘the wake-up call for terrorism’, ushering in a new era of terror in the Netherlands. Sybrant van Hulst – the present head of the AIVD – recently declared that the reason for this careful use of the term terrorism in the past was the hope of the Dutch authorities at that time, that things would perhaps not go from bad to worse thanks to this careful approach. [11]

Vrijsen points to the fact that as a result of acts of terrorism on Dutch soil in the last 35 years already 28 people died, including 6 of the perpetrators, and including Theo van Gogh.[12] Although some would argue that most of these acts were not real acts of terrorism, it will be shown in this section that the label ‘acts of terrorism’ is actually quite suitable to refer to the vast majority of the above mentioned events in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s.

If we take the definition of political terrorism by Maxmilián Strmiska as the point of departure, it can be demonstrated that this label is indeed suitable. He defines terrorism as ‘a politically motivated […] method (fashion, strategy) of the, more or less, systemised use of violence (mostly armed violence, deliberately ignoring war conventions), of which the main objective is to achieve a certain psychological effect, which reaches beyond the circle of its direct victims or witnesses, an effect of which, considering its presupposed political significance, its direct physical impact is of secondary importance. An organic component of this effect is the moment of intimidation; terrorisation of the target public or at least a certain sector of the target public, which, naturally, does not mean that we are concerned here with the solely and necessarily dominant component.’[13].

More than half of the earlier mentioned 28 people that died in the last 35 years on Dutch soil as a result of politically motivated violent acts, died during two hijackings[14] (the first one in 1975 and the second one in 1977) by perpetrators deriving from the South Moluccan community in the Netherlands.[15] A large part of the inhabitants of the Southern Molucs have been striving for more than 50 years for their independence from the Republic of Indonesia, which violently imposed its authority over the former, shortly after it was released from century-long Dutch colonial rule. Through the hijackings the Southern Moluccans hoped to force the Dutch government to support them in their efforts to gain independence from Indonesia.

Others died in the Netherlands as a result of violence by the RAF (in 1977), the IRA (in 1990 and probably also the liquidation of the British ambassador to the Netherlands in 1979)[16] and, according to Vrijsen, also by an armed Armenian movement[17] (however, no date is mentioned and no other consulted source confirmed his claim). Moreover, the so-called Japanese Red Army took as hostage the French ambassador in 1974 in the Dutch city of The Hague and a number of bombings (altogether around 10) were carried out on Dutch soil by the following movements: Palestinian El-Fatah Movement (in 1972); the so-called Red Youth (in 1972); RaRa (in 1984, 1990, 1991, and in 1993); and ETA (1990). Non of these latter events resulted, however, in deadly victims.[18]

All “actions” mentioned in this section should be considered as “acts of terrorism” provided that one recognises the validity of Strmisky’s definition of political terrorism: all of these “actions” were politically motivated; in all of them violence and a certain type of arm was used; the main objective of all of them was to achieve a certain psychological effect, which was meant to reach beyond the circle of its direct victims or witnesses; with all of them their physical impact was subordinate to their political significance; and finally, the moment of intimidation was an “organic component” of all of them.

Despite the fact that the Netherlands thus already has quite some past experience with terrorist activities, it did not have, until 9/11, any anti-terrorism law.[19] And even after 9/11 it was especially only at the instigation of the European Union that the Dutch government adopted suchlike law(s). The likely reasons for this are, first, the earlier mentioned apprehension to use the term “terrorism” to refer to certain event and, second, because the Netherlands since the South Moluccan terrorist actions in the 1970s had not been hit for decades by any act of terrorist of the same scale and with the same dramatic nature.[20]

II: THE PROCESS OF ISLAMIC RADICALISATION AND TERRORIST RECRUITMENT ACTIVITIES IN THE NETHERLANDS

According to Akerboom, the war on terrorism, which was initiated as a direct result of the events of 9/11, did result in the tendency of Islamic-terrorist networks/movements to work more autonomously than before and to commit terrorist attacks on so-called soft-targets more often.[21] These networks are, however, still prepared and capable to execute terrorist attacks, and the threat of terrorist attacks to date on Dutch soil is probably even higher than ever before in the light of al-Qaida’s threats of last July[22] addressed to several Western European countries, among which also the Netherlands.[23] In addition, Akerboom stresses that the way of operating of these networks is characterised by thoroughness and patience, and that there is, hence, no reason to assume that the threat of terrorist attacks in the Netherlands in coming years will diminish.[24]

In the case of the Netherlands, the present danger is much connected to the process of Islamic radicalisation, since, as already mentioned in the introduction, the terrorism threat is coming increasingly from local Dutch radical-Islamic networks. Especially in certain neighbourhoods in large Dutch cities the process of Islamic radicalisation has been revealed by the arrest of – with help of information from the AIVD – a number of people who where involved in the preparation and (in only one case for the time being) execution of terrorist activities motivated by radical-Islamic convictions. In addition to this, a number of people have been suspected in recent years of recruiting (especially) young Muslims for the preparation and execution of terrorist activities. This phenomenon is connected to an external threat of Islamic terrorist networks/movements (since the recruiters are almost always non-Dutch residents) and has partly its roots in Dutch society, since the declining integration and insufficient acceptation of Muslim immigrants appear to be a fertile soil for radicalisation.

According to a cautious assessment, in the year 2002 at least 10 recruiters – also known in Dutch intelligence circles as “Islamic warriors” or “Mujahedin”[25] – of young Muslims were active in the Netherlands, which means that it can be assumed that several dozens of young Muslims were in the recruitment process.[26] The activities of the Mujahedin came to light for the first time in January 2002, when two young Dutch Moroccans died in the Idian state of Kashmir.[27] Only later it was discovered that both were recruited by radical Islamists and mentally prepared to participate in the Jihad.[28] The murder on Theo van Gogh on November 2, 2004, which is considered as being the first Islamic-terrorist attack in the Netherlands to date, was also committed by suchlike radicalised formerly-recruited young Muslim,[29] who was the leader of the terrorist cell (the so-called “Hofstad Network”) that was rolled up in the Dutch city of The Hague short after the murder.

Also all the members of this Hofstad Network and the persons that were arrested this month in The Hague (whether these persons also belonged to the Hofstad Network is not yet clear), which are suspected of having made preparations of terrorist attacks on several locations in the Netherlands,[30] were recruited by radical Islamists in recent years.[31] These recent events indicate that the recruitment of young Muslims has been continuing to date. They may also signal that the first groups of recruits (grouped in groups/networks/cells such as the Hofstad Network, of which there are very likely more at this moment in the Netherlands) has successfully absolved the recruitment process and that only time will show if and when these yet unknown (except for the Hofstad Network), individual terrorist-recruits or terrorist cells will become active.

This recruitment of young Muslims for terrorist activities is not only a threat to Dutch national security in the sense that the danger of future terrorist attacks has emerged, it also potentially has a destabilising influence on Dutch society in general. The Mujahedin –and the movements/networks behind them- by their recruitment activities exercise a deliberately polarising influence on members of the large Muslim community in the Netherlands. In other words, they attempt to increase the distance between the Muslim community and the allochthonous population and in this way they hope to prevent the integration of the former in Dutch society. The persuasion power of the Mujahedin during their recruitments lies in their continuous appellation of the idea that the rights and interest of the “good” Muslim in the West are violated over and over again.[32]

Recruitment of young Muslims by the Mujahedin is, however, not the only way in which radical Muslim terrorist-movements try to prevent Muslim communities from integrating into Dutch society. The integration and emancipation process of Muslims in the Netherlands is not entirely autonomous and is to a certain degree influenced by different Islamic political forces from inside and outside the country. Two important places where these political forces exercise there influence on the integration process are the mosque and the field of education.

It should be stressed, however, that the influence of the political Islam (including the Mujahedin) is to date still quite moderate, and although a certain antipathy against Western society and resistance against integration in general can be detected in broader Muslim circles, only a small (however increasing) number of Muslims in the Netherlands holds radical ideals and is really prepared to bring closer their ideal of an Islamic state or world order through violence or support to violence. Even those who do, in most cases only focus their attention on the battle in their country of origin and not on the fate of the Muslims in the West.[33]

III: MEASURES TAKEN BY THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT TO PREVENT ACTS OF TERRORISM IN THE NETHERLANDS

The general perception in the Netherlands at present is that it is relatively more at risk of terrorist actions than most other European countries, due to a combination of several realities: first, the past presence of Dutch troops in Iraq and their current presence in Afghanistan. Second, the strong Transatlantic orientation of the Netherlands in general, third, the presence in the Netherlands of a huge Muslim population (circa 1 million Muslims out of a total population of circa 16 million[34]), some sections of which are potentially sensitive to processes of radicalisation as described in the previous section.[35] And last but not least, the threats expressed by al-Qaida in last July which were, as mentioned earlier on, addressed also to the Dutch government.

The increased fear of terrorist attacks on Dutch soil, however, dates already back to 9/11 and is reflected in policy measures taken by the Dutch government ever since. The fields in which most new measures were implemented are: the organisation and functioning of certain governmental institutions (e.g. intelligence services and relevant ministries); the provision of information about terrorism to citizens; governmental and other relevant organisations; criminal law; and the European and International cooperation in the anti-terrorism field. In addition to this, many measures were taken by the government on an ad hoc basis – sometimes only temporarily – to increase the security of certain persons and/or locations in the Netherlands in reaction to certain alarming events and developments at home, in Europe, or elsewhere in the world.

After the terrorist attacks in the US on September 11, 2001, the prevention of terrorist attacks in Netherlands became, for an important part at the instigation of the EU, one of the most important priorities of the Dutch government. This appeared, for instance, from the 2001 Action Plan Terrorism Prevention and Security –adopted in direct reaction to 9/11- that consists of a number of strengthened and new measures, with which the government wanted to intensify the fight against terrorism. The initiatives in the plan were mainly aimed at – in addition to prevention of terrorist attacks – facilitating the tracking down and prosecution of terrorists.[36]

The initiatives aimed at prevention of terrorist action included: improving the access to important information by the police, intelligence, and security services, and more capacity for the guarding of threatened persons and objects. Also more resources from the national budget became available for the expansion of the possibilities for so-called biometry, which is the identification of persons according to their body characteristics, which makes it easier to track down terrorists. Moreover, more resources have been made available to enhance the security of civil airports and civil flights. As far as the tracking down and prosecution of terrorists are concerned, more resources have been made available to hire extra personnel (inquiry agents/investigators and analysts) and to purchase modern technology to tap (mobile) phones etc., which will be helpful in the process of tracking down and prosecuting persons involved in terrorist activities or their preparations, like the Mujahedin. [37]

To become more specific: with regard to the organisation of the AIVD, for instance, important changes that have taken place since September 11, 2001[38] (and successive terrorist attacks) are: first, the number of its employees has been increased, but also its work in the anti-terrorism field (collecting intelligence and enhancing the effectiveness of anti-terrorism measures) is expanded: at present the majority part of the work of the AIVD is connected to the fight against Islamic terrorism. Second, a recent governmental proposal that is at present under review by the Dutch parliament, will – provided that it is passed – increase the possibilities to use evidence gathered by the AIVD in cases brought to court. Also the cooperation between the AIVD, the National Police Corps, the Ministry of Justice and the Immigration and Naturalisation Service has recently been institutionalised. Also international cooperation forums between the AIVD and foreign intelligence services have been established.[39]

Since the terrorist attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004, the earlier mentioned murder of film producer Theo van Gogh, and the terrorist attacks in June and July this year in London, the Dutch government again has taken a large number of new measures, on top of the measures codified in the 2001 Action Plan, to decrease the likeliness of future terrorist attacks in the Netherlands.

Recent changes in Dutch law enabled, in the case of acute terrorist threats, the delegation of extra powers to the Dutch Minister of Justice. These extra powers mean that this minister is allowed take measures in the areas of competence normally belonging to other ministers. Action that can be taken by him or her, include for instance, the cancellation of all air and train traffic and telephone connections in the whole country.[40] Recent plans are to strengthen the institutionalisation of these new possibilities for coordinated action through a Dutch Ministry for Security.[41]

Another initiative by the Dutch government, which reflected its desire to strengthen possibilities for coordinated action and cooperation in the anti-terrorism policy field, was the appointment of a so-called National Co-ordinator for Terrorism Combat (who became operational as from January 1, 2005[42]), who is responsible for the improvement of the cooperation between the approximately 20 organisations in the Netherlands, which are at present involved in the creation and the implementation of anti-terrorism policy.[43] Also he or she (the Co-ordinator) is the person who is ultimately responsible for the development of anti-terrorism policy, the analysis of information provided by intelligence services and the anti-terrorism measures taken during crisis situations. The National Co-ordinator is responsible to the Ministers of Justice and Interior.[44]

Related important measures recently implemented by the government are meant to improve communication in the field of terrorism combat – for instance, through the launching of three terrorism-information websites.[45] Another aspect of this improved communication is the development of a system to warn government institutions, companies and the public in crisis situations connected to terrorist activities. With this new “alerting system” these groups will be informed with help of recognisable codes in the case of higher risk of terrorist attacks (this alerting system at present indicates the presence of a “substantial” threat). Certain codes are coupled to certain precautionary measures.[46]

In reaction to the ongoing radicalisation process in Dutch society as being described in the previous section, the Dutch government has taken a number of important decisions earlier this year. For instance, permanent so-called “security areas” will be established in which people can be preventively searched, and courts will be enabled to prohibit certain persons with a high risk profile to be near to certain persons and objects. In addition to this, a new controversial criminal law enables the Dutch government to prosecute persons for the so-called glorification of terrorism[47] (when one publicly pronounces terrorism as being a positive thing). Moreover, did the cabinet reserve more than 400 million to intensify the fight against terrorism and Islamic radicalisation for the coming five years and the intelligence, security and inquiry services will be expanded with 600 new employees.[48]

Finally, it is necessary to briefly mention the international and European context in which the Dutch government is developing its anti-terrorism policy. In addition to the above mentioned institutionalised cooperation between the AIVD and other intelligence services abroad, the Dutch government is actively supporting initiatives also on the European level, such as the appointment – in the light of the perceived international terrorism-threat – of a so-called EU security co-ordinator (Gijs de Vries), who is responsible for the co-ordination of anti-terrorism measures and co-ordination of the cooperation between police and intelligence services of the EU member states. This cooperation between EU Member States is recently confirmed in the so-called Hague’s Programme, which was established under the last Dutch Council Presidency.[49]

CONCLUSION

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 have had an enormous impact on the internal security-policy of many countries in the world. Also a small country such as the Netherlands did not escape the influence and consequences of this event. A combination of factors have even lead to the perception in the Netherlands that it is at present at greater risk of terrorist attacks than most other countries. This perception is not solely based on irrational fears. The past presence of Dutch army units in Iraq and their current presence in Afghanistan; the strong Transatlantic orientation of the country; the process of radicalisation among certain members of the Dutch Muslim community; the recent murder of film producer Theo van Gogh and the successive arrests of a number of persons suspected of preparing terrorist actions (the last of which were arrested this month); and the recent threat by al-Qaida indeed seem to give good reason for an increased state of alertness, the implementation of preventive measures, and the strengthening of the capacity of the Dutch government to act effectively in crisis situations.

The danger is, however, that in the long term the alertness and operational preparedness of the Dutch government in the case of crisis situations might weaken, especially when the next direct and serious terrorism threat will not occur in the short or medium term. The thoroughness and patience with which most terrorist are known to prepare their plans indicate that it cannot be afforded that this alertness and operational preparedness weakens over time, and given the fact that to date there are no signs indicating that the terrorism threat is diminishing in any way (the arrests that were carried out at the time of writing proved rather the contrary), anti-terrorism policy must permanently remain an absolute priority of the Dutch government if future drama’s are to be prevented.

The terrorist attacks in London a few months ago, showed, however, that even a permanent state of alertness and operational preparedness do not rule out completely acts of terrorism, especially when the perpetrators are able to put together their bombs with relatively cheap and easily obtainable materials, when these perpetrators are prepared to die together with the victims of their actions, and when they can carry out their actions at any place, at any time. What state of alertness, operational preparedness and means can measure up to this? Probably little. 9/11 ushered in an era in which people will have to learn to live on a permanent basis with the ever present danger of terrorism, which can hit also them personally. The question should be also for the Dutch, not íf Islamic terrorism will hit their country again, but whén it will do so. If the Dutch learn to accept this reality, and the fact that the overwhelming majority of the Muslim population in their country wishes to lead the same peaceful lives as they do themselves, a future radical-Islamic terrorist attack in the Low Countries would potentially have a less destabilising impact on their society.

POZNÁMKY

[1] Mareš 2004, 21.
[2] ACVZ 2003.
[3] This deduction is based on the assumption that if terrorist attacks can take place in the US (9.11.2001), in Madrid (11.3.2004), and in London (21.06.2005 and 07.07.2005), than there is also a realistic chance than they will take place in the Netherlands.
[4] The murder of Dutch film-producer Theo van Gogh, who had produced a controversial film on the abuse of Muslim women, the subsequent arrest of a number of members from the Dutch terrorist cell, known as the “Hofstad Network”, and the arrest in this month (October 2005) of 7 Islamic-terrorism suspects in the Dutch city of The Hague.
[5] Akerboom, not dated, 1. Recruitment of “warriors” for the “Islamic battle”, with which the Netherlands was confronted in recent years is indicating the presence of a growing violent and radical-islamic movement in Dutch society.
[6] FindLaw 2005
[7] Elsevier.nl 2005a.
[8] Akerboom, not dated, 2.
[9] Zeman et al 2002, 20.
[10] Wikipedia 2005b.
[11] Vrijsen 2005
[12] Vrijsen 2005
[13] Mareš 2004, 20.
[14] NRC Handelsblad 2000
[15] Vrijsen 2005
[16] Wikipedia 2005
[17] Vrijsen 2005
[18] Wikipedia 2005
[19] Vrijsen 2005
[20] Rosental et al 2005, 130.
[21] Less protected targets, such as tourist places (whereas in the past mostly diplomatic and military objectives were the target of terrorist attacks).
[22] The threat was an ultimatum to the governments of several Western European governments. If these governments would not withdraw their troops from Iraq and Afghanistan within one month, terrorist attacks in their respective countries would be executed.
[23] Stichting Meervrijheid 2005
[24] Akerboom, not dated, 1-2.
[25] Akerboom, not dated, 2.
[26] AIVD 2002, 1.
[27] Eikelenboom 2004, 10.
[28] Akerboom, not dated, 3. Although the word Jihad has different meanings in Arabic, here it is meant to refer to the holy war of Muslims world-wide.
[29] Regering.nl 2005.
[30] Pictures and maps were found during the arrest of the members of the Hofstad Network, which appear to indicate that terrorist attacks were planned at the Royal Palace in The Hague; Schiphol Airport near to Amsterdam; and the Nuclear Power Plant at Doorsel.
[31] Those who succesfully absolved the reqruitment process.
[32] Akerboom, not dated, 2-3.
[33] Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst, not dated, 4.
[34] Volkskrant 2004.
[35] Justitie.nl 2004.
[36] Justitie.nl 2001.
[37] Justitie.nl 2001.
[38] Akerboom, not dated, 1.
[39] Justitie.nl 2004.
[40] Regering.nl 2004.
[41] Elsevier.nl 2005b.
[42] Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding 2005, 1.
[43] Justitie.nl 2004.
[44] Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding 2005, 1-2.
[45] http://terrorisme.pagina.nl and http://www.nctb.nl and http://www.regering.nl/actueel/nieuwsarchief/2005/09September/16/0-42-1_42-71285.jsp
[46] Justitie.nl 2004.
[47] Wessling 2005.
[48] Justitie.nl 2005.
[49] Justitie.nl 2005.

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